The U.N. envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, warned the Security Council that the country’s transition remains fragile, with the risk of renewed violence despite a ceasefire in Sweida last month.
Deadly clashes erupted there in July between Druze militias and Sunni Bedouin tribes, with government forces siding with the Bedouins and Israel launching airstrikes in defense of the Druze. Although the July 19 ceasefire has mostly held, skirmishes continue, and Pedersen cautioned that fighting could resume at any time.
A relief team on the ground provided photos, videos, and eyewitness accounts documenting the atrocity. According to sources, the killings were carried out by a government military patrol from the forces that stormed the city that morning.
Syria has been unstable since the ouster of Bashar Assad in December, which ended decades of Assad family rule. Ethnic and sectarian divisions remain deep, and violence continues to flare. Meanwhile, U.N. humanitarian chief Tom Fletcher described Syria’s situation as “dire,” with 16 million people in need of aid.
He said convoys have come under fire, and funding for relief is critically short, with only 14 percent of the U.N.’s $3.19 billion appeal for 2025 met so far.
Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) seized power in Syria after leading a lightning offensive in December 2024 that toppled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The offensive began in late November, and Damascus fell on December 8, 2024.
Al-Sharaa became Syria’s de facto leader that month and was officially named interim president in January 2025. The Assad regime collapsed after a 12-day offensive led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
Since taking power, al-Sharaa’s rule has been marked by massacres and systematic attacks on minorities, including Christians. Between March 6 and March 27, 2025, at least 1,300–1,659 Alawite civilians were killed in sectarian violence in Syria’s coastal regions. Reports also documented the mass distribution of flyers inciting hate speech against Alawites and the destruction of Alawi religious shrines.
Minority Christians have also come under attack. On December 18, 2024, militants fired on a Greek Orthodox church in Hama, and on December 23, foreign fighters torched a Christmas tree in Al-Suqaylabiyah. In June 2025, a suicide bomber struck the Greek Orthodox Mar Elias Church in Damascus during Divine Liturgy, killing at least 30 worshippers. Several Christians were also killed during the March Alawite massacres, including priests and civilians.
Beginning April 28, 2025, sectarian violence against Syria’s Druze communities left dozens of civilians dead, many executed extrajudicially. The bloodshed escalated in July, when nearly 1,000 people were killed in Sweida province, including 588 Druze, with many bodies burned and mutilated.
For extremist groups like HTS, the Druze are seen as heretics, and acts such as the forced shaving of mustaches are meant not as trivial insults but as deliberate tools of humiliation and sectarian domination. Suwayda, a mountainous province in southern Syria, has long been the Druze heartland.
Though nominally under Syrian government control, the region has preserved a degree of autonomy through local militias and community leaders. The Druze faith, which originated from Isma’ili Shia Islam and evolved into a distinct monotheistic tradition blending philosophy, mysticism, and Islamic elements, has made the community a target for jihadist groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda.
UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen warned the Security Council that Syria’s situation remains “extremely fragile” and has reached “a truly critical juncture.” He stressed that rule of law, a new social contract, and fair elections have yet to materialize, and emphasized that building trust is essential, cautioning that “a climate of distrust and fear could endanger the entire process.”
It is hardly surprising that al-Jolani has failed to transform Syria into an egalitarian utopia where ethnic minorities could live together in peace. His history is steeped in terrorism. He began as a foreign fighter in the Iraq War, traveling from Syria to join Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq.
Rising quickly through the ranks, he became the emir of the Nineveh region in western Iraq for the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the predecessor to ISIS. Over the years, al-Jolani has been a member, leader, and affiliate of two of the world’s deadliest terrorist organizations—al-Qaeda and ISIS.
After the Syrian uprising began in 2011, al-Jolani talked to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi about a project in Syria. By summer 2011, al-Jolani went to Syria to build a new organization called Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Nusra Front), which was essentially an official branch of the Islamic State of Iraq Al-Baghdadi (leader of ISI, predecessor to ISIS) sent Jolani to Syria to establish the Al-Nusra Front as a branch of al-Qaeda Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa)
When conflict escalated in 2013, Jolani rejected Baghdadi’s calls to dissolve the Nusra Front and merge it with ISI to form ISIS. Instead, he pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa)
Al-Sharaa crossed into Syria with significant funding and a mandate to establish al-Qaeda’s presence, forming “Jabhat al-Nusra” with direct allegiance to al-Qaeda’s central command
The Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention has issued an alert over the risk that ongoing violence could escalate into genocide. Minority communities, particularly Alawites and Christians, are openly questioning whether they “can live in an Islamist country and not be Muslim.”
Despite the political transition, these populations remain highly vulnerable to war crimes, raising urgent concerns about the inclusivity of the process and the protection of minorities.
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