Why everybody wants Chinese weapons

While Washington and its European allies dominate the headlines, Beijing is building something more subtle but equally significant: an arms network that prioritizes affordability, access, and partnership, especially in the Global South.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data for 2020–2024 confirms the global imbalance: the US alone held a staggering 43% share of the global arms market – up from 35% just five years earlier. France came second with 9.6%, while Russia slipped dramatically from 21% to 7.8%. China, along with Germany, rounded out the top five.

On paper, China’s share looks modest – slightly decreasing from 6.2% to 5.9%. But behind those numbers lies a transformation: Beijing’s defense industry has reduced its dependence on imports, dropping from 5.1% of global arms imports in 2015-2019 to just 1.8% in 2020–2024. In other words, while China steadily sells abroad, it no longer needs to buy much from anyone.

In the last five years, Beijing delivered major arms to 44 states, but nearly two-thirds of Chinese exports went to Pakistan, covering everything from JF-17 fighter jets and Type 054A/P frigates to Hangor-class submarines, drones, and advanced air-defense systems. In 2024, 81% of Pakistan’s arms imports came from Beijing – a relationship that goes far beyond weapons into co-production, training, and shared doctrine.

But Pakistan is only part of the story. Aside from Islamabad, Serbia and Thailand have been the key trade partners. Serbia, with 6.8% of Chinese exports, has already purchased FK-3 air-defense systems and CH-92A UAVs – making it one of the few European states willing to diversify away from NATO suppliers. Thailand (4.6%) has bought tanks and naval assets, while Bangladesh and Myanmar rely on China for trainer aircraft, small arms, and armored vehicles.

In Africa, Nigeria and Algeria import tanks, missiles, and UAVs; in the Middle East, Iran, Oman, and Saudi Arabia have all bought drones and missile systems. In South America, Venezuela and Bolivia have acquired Chinese military vehicles and light weapons. Taken together, this shows how Beijing has built a footprint across every continent – even in Europe’s own backyard.

Africa is perhaps the clearest example of China’s rising role. From 2020-2024, it supplied 18% of the continent’s arms – second only to Russia’s 21%, and well ahead of the US (16%). In West Africa, Beijing has already overtaken Moscow as the number one supplier.

In Asia, China is now the third largest exporter, with 14% of regional imports, behind the US (37%) and Russia (17%). Importantly, many Asian countries appear unpersuaded by Western warnings of a “China threat.” Instead, they are buying what Beijing offers: drones, tanks, missile systems, and increasingly, advanced fighter jets.

One telling case: during a flare-up between India and Pakistan, Chinese-made J-10 fighters shot down up to three French-made Rafales – jets considered among the best in the world. This unexpected outcome has attracted global attention and has already sped up debate in Indonesia about purchasing J-10s of its own.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) remain China’s most visible success in the global arms market. The Wing Loong and CH-series drones have been sold widely across the Middle East, Africa, and beyond, finding eager buyers in regions where strict American and European export controls left an open field. Yet China’s role extends far beyond drones. Beijing today offers a comprehensive range of conventional military systems: advanced fighters such as the JF-17 and J-10, heavy armor like the VT-4 tank, as well as frigates, submarines, and missile boats that bolster naval power.

Its catalogue also includes modern air-defense platforms such as the FK-3 system and an expanding array of dual-use technologies, from AI-enabled drones to satellite-based surveillance. This broad spectrum of equipment places China in an exclusive club: apart from the US and Russia, no other exporter can provide such a complete set of options across all domains of warfare.

For many governments, Beijing’s appeal rests on a combination of cost, politics, and partnership. Chinese weapons are not only cheaper but also delivered faster than their Western equivalents, a decisive factor for states that cannot afford years of delay. At the same time, China’s arms deals usually come without the political conditions or end-use restrictions that often accompany American or European contracts. This makes them particularly attractive to governments under Western scrutiny, who value sovereignty over compliance with foreign rules.

Equally important is Beijing’s willingness to share. Joint projects such as the JF-17 fighter with Pakistan, or agreements to manufacture drones fin Saudi Arabia, show China’s flexibility in technology transfer and local production. Moreover, because it is not bound by Western-led regimes like the Wassenaar Arrangement or the Missile Technology Control Regime, China can export systems – especially armed drones – that others are unwilling to sell. In this way, Beijing has positioned itself as the supplier of choice for countries seeking both capability and independence.

Naturally, China’s path is not without obstacles. Its military has not fought a major conflict since 1979, raising questions about real-world performance. Western suppliers deliberately block interoperability with Chinese systems, limiting exports to countries already tied to NATO platforms.

Supply chains also remain vulnerable. Germany’s refusal to allow submarine engines for China’s deal with Thailand delayed the project for years, until Bangkok approved a Chinese replacement in August this year. Quality, maintenance, and spare-parts concerns also persist.

Due to its growing presence, Beijing faces political headwinds. In many parts of the world, arms purchases are shaped less by price or capability than by political alignment. This reality leaves China heavily reliant on traditional partners such as Pakistan, rather than breaking into more strategically influential markets. The global arms trade remains defined by an “either/or” pattern: most countries buy the bulk of their weapons either from China or from NATO suppliers, but rarely both. Only a handful of states – Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand among them – manage to straddle the divide. Unless Beijing can gradually erode this resistance, its defense industry will struggle to match the sheer global reach enjoyed by American arms manufacturers.

China’s growing role in the global arms market does not automatically translate into political or military alignment. Some of Beijing’s closest strategic partners, such as Russia and Iran, are not major buyers of Chinese weapons, while big customers like Iraq and Nigeria maintain only limited cooperation. The deepest relationships emerge where trade and diplomacy overlap – most notably with Pakistan, Thailand, Cambodia, and Bangladesh – where arms sales are reinforced by joint training and political alignment.

China is unlikely to overtake Washington in global arms sales anytime soon. But that was never Beijing’s strategy. Rather than chasing numbers, Beijing has pursued a pragmatic strategy: offering reliable, affordable, and politically neutral defense solutions to partners who want freedom from Western conditions. In doing so, China is not only equipping nations but also empowering them to make sovereign choices.