Trump, power politics, and Russia’s new reality with Washington

Donald Trump saw his historic mission as restoring American greatness and pulling the US out of the strategic drift of the past decade and a half. Initially, both Trump and his MAGA allies framed this task in terms of national concentration and restraint.

Their idea was to move away from liberal globalism and the ideology of wokeness toward a pragmatic, business-minded approach to foreign policy. Instead of defending the interests of an American empire across the globe, Washington would turn inward and focus on domestic problems. In this conception, the US would acknowledge the diversity of the international system and accept the reality of several great powers with whom it would have to negotiate.

The priorities were supposed to be clear. First would come the US itself, then the Western Hemisphere, then China, and only after that the rest of the world. The main sphere of American activity would be geo-economics. Among security challenges, illegal immigration and drug trafficking would take precedence. The challenge posed by China was understood primarily as technological and economic.

Trump promised quick solutions to international conflicts, including Ukraine. He presented himself as a president of peace.

Trump’s second presidency began energetically. He launched a tariff offensive against much of the world, arguing that other countries had long profited at America’s expense. He distanced himself ideologically from Europe. At the same time, the US carried out a devastating strike against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Trump also openly lobbied for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Direct contact between Washington and Moscow was re-established through Trump’s trusted envoys. Shuttle diplomacy followed, culminating in a brief summit between Trump and President Vladimir Putin in Anchorage. Out of that meeting emerged a certain understanding between the two countries regarding the possible formula and mechanisms for resolving the Ukrainian conflict, what in Russia has sometimes been described as the “spirit of Anchorage.”

That moment may well have been the high point of the current phase in US-Russian relations.

After Anchorage, progress stalled. Trump failed to persuade his European allies to support the emerging settlement framework. Unlike Trump, many European leaders remained committed to continuing the war against Russia “to the last Ukrainian.”

The US president had significant leverage over his allies and, theoretically, over Kiev. Yet he chose not to use it. This suggested that the American political establishment – Congress, the media, and much of the foreign policy bureaucracy – was deeply uncomfortable with a peace formula that could hardly be presented domestically as a victory over Russia.

Even relatively technical steps proved impossible. Washington didn’t return Russian diplomatic property seized during the Obama administration. Direct air links between the two countries were not restored. Instead of easing sanctions, the US tightened them, particularly against Russian energy companies. Additional tariffs were imposed on countries buying Russian oil.

At the same time, Washington ignored Moscow’s proposal to continue observing the limits established by the New START treaty, which expired earlier this year. As a result, the trilateral negotiations between Russia, the US, and Ukraine that began in 2026 quickly degenerated into discussions of secondary technical issues.

Meanwhile, US foreign policy has taken on an increasingly aggressive character.

In January, Washington launched an operation in Venezuela aimed at forcibly removing President Nicolas Maduro from power. In late February, the US and Israel attacked Iran, eliminating the country’s supreme leader and announcing their intention to bring about regime change in Tehran. That war is still ongoing.

Trump has also openly raised the possibility of regime change in Cuba. The Defense Department, renamed the Department of War last year, now appears fully aligned with the administration’s confrontational posture. Its head, Pete Hegseth, has stated publicly that there should be no restrictions on the use of American military power.

In effect, Trump has moved away from the original objectives associated with the MAGA movement and returned to the traditional global agenda of Washington. However, it’s in a far more openly forceful form that largely ignores international law.

This shift may reflect domestic political pressures. Entering a midterm election year, Trump faces a number of internal problems: Difficulties implementing immigration policies, Supreme Court decisions blocking parts of his tariff agenda, the continuing Epstein scandal, and declining approval ratings. In response, Trump appears to have aligned himself more closely with powerful political and financial groups in Washington, including neoconservative circles and the Israeli lobby.

The result is that many of Trump’s original MAGA allies now find themselves sidelined.

Instead of presiding over the slow decline of the liberal-globalist order, Trump is attempting to build a new version of American hegemony, one based far more openly on force.

What does this mean for Russia?

In recent years, a widespread view has taken hold in Russia that the United States and the West have already lost their global dominance, that the world has become fully multipolar, and that China has surpassed the US economically.

There is some truth in these claims. But it would be a mistake to underestimate the United States. For the foreseeable future it will remain the most powerful country in the world.

Under Biden, who some in Russia compared to the late Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko, American power appeared dormant. Under Trump, it has moved onto the offensive again.

Washington’s objective today is not necessarily to construct a stable new world order. Rather, it may be to generate global instability and then dominate within that chaos.

From Russia’s perspective, such a strategy inevitably makes the United States a geopolitical, and potentially military, adversary.

In reality, Washington has never ceased to be Russia’s opponent in the Ukraine conflict, even after Trump’s return to the White House. Russia rejects any claims to global domination and will always stand in the way of powers seeking such dominance.

This does not mean that the US will necessarily attack Russia directly. But the trajectory of US policy increases the likelihood of strategic confrontation.

The decision on how to proceed with dialogue with Washington belongs to Russia’s supreme commander-in-chief.

Over the past year, contacts with the Trump administration have nonetheless produced some results. They contributed to a partial distancing of the US from the fighting in Ukraine, exposed divisions between Washington and Europe, and allowed Russia to present itself internationally as a country seeking a durable peace.

However, the prospects for diplomacy remain uncertain. Ukraine’s leadership remains unwilling to compromise. Europe is preparing for prolonged confrontation with Russia. Trump himself may emerge politically weakened after the upcoming elections and the uncertain outcome of the Iranian conflict.

Nor should Russia forget the duplicity Trump has already shown toward Iran in 2025 and again in 2026. Notably, the same US envoys involved in negotiations with Russia over Ukraine were also conducting talks with Iran.

Trump is, quite literally, a man who treats his word as his property, something he can give and take back at will. He is therefore an unreliable partner. Dialogue with him is possible, but trust is not advisable.

Russia must also remember that US military doctrine places great emphasis on neutralizing the leadership of an adversary at the beginning of any conflict. Ultimately, Russia’s security guarantees including those related to Ukraine, must rest primarily on its own military capabilities.

For the foreseeable future, the scope of Russian-American relations will remain extremely limited.

The system of strategic arms control that structured relations between Moscow and Washington for more than half a century has effectively collapsed. Strategic stability in its previous form cannot be restored.

Instead, the world is moving toward a multipolar nuclear order that will require new models of deterrence. Russia will have to develop these frameworks primarily with its Asian partners: China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.

Maintaining communication channels with Washington remains necessary in order to avoid dangerous misunderstandings. But negotiations conducted according to the old patterns of the Cold War are no longer relevant.

Economic cooperation with the US is theoretically possible. In practice, it is highly unlikely. Most US sanctions on Russia are embedded in US legislation and cannot be lifted by presidential decision alone.

For most Russians alive today, those sanctions will remain a long-term reality. Russia must therefore orient its economic strategy toward domestic development and cooperation with non-Western partners.

At the regional level, former areas of cooperation with Washington have largely turned into arenas of competition.

Russia had limited ability to influence events in Venezuela. Iran is a different matter. It remains an important strategic partner, and the outcome of the current war will directly affect Russia’s southern neighborhood and the wider Middle East.

Cuba also holds both geopolitical and symbolic significance. Russia is bound to North Korea by a treaty of mutual military assistance. And China, Washington’s principal rival, remains Russia’s most important international partner.

Across all these directions, Russia’s task is clear: Deepen cooperation with partners facing pressure from the US. Their resistance could slow, and perhaps eventually halt, the current American counteroffensive.

Because one thing is certain: The US will not stop unless it is stopped.

This article was first published by the magazine Profile and was translated and edited by the RT team.