Russia’s Next-Generation Glide Bomb

During the 24-hour period from September 17 to 18, Russian forces dropped 295 guided glide bombs on Ukraine in 95 airstrikes. This number reflects Russia’s growing reliance on the weapon.

A glide bomb is a conventional bomb released from an aircraft, not a missile or rocket launched from the ground. Fitted with deployable wings and a guidance system, it uses the aircraft’s altitude and speed to travel tens of kilometers toward its target. This allows the aircraft to release the bomb without flying directly over the target, reducing its exposure to Ukrainian air defenses.

Russia began large-scale production of a new glide bomb capable of striking targets up to 200 kilometers from its release point, according to Vadym Skibitskyi, deputy head of Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence (HUR).

In November 2025, Skibitskyi told Reuters that Russia planned to produce approximately 500 of the new bombs by the end of that year. They were part of a broader production program encompassing approximately 120,000 glide bombs and 70,000 long-range drones in 2025.

The current KAB threat did not emerge overnight. Russia’s glide-bomb arsenal initially centered on two principal systems, according to an analysis by the Joint Air Power Competence Centre.

The first is the UMPK, an approximately $20,000 conversion kit fitted to Soviet-era FAB-500 and FAB-1500 bombs. These weapons typically have a range of 60 to 70 kilometers. The second is the UMPB D-30SN, a purpose-built glide bomb rather than a retrofit kit. First observed in spring 2024, it has an estimated range of up to 90 kilometers and greater resistance to jamming.

By early 2025, Russia was releasing approximately 3,500 UMPK-equipped bombs per month, more than 100 per day across the front. Most were carried by Su-34 “Fullback” fighter-bombers, which typically carry four glide bombs per sortie and release them 35 to 50 kilometers from the front line.

Skibitskyi later estimated that Russian forces were releasing between 200 and 250 glide bombs per day. By June 2026, the rate had risen further. Russia reportedly dropped more than 1,800 glide bombs during the first week of that month.

Newer UMPK variants have also extended the weapon’s range to as much as 95 kilometers.

These new long-range bombs are reportedly fitted with an additional propulsion system and a standardized guidance module. Their estimated 200-kilometer range is more than twice that of the glide bombs Russia previously used against Mykolaiv, Poltava, Odesa, and Kharkiv. Lozova is approximately 150 kilometers from the front line, placing it far beyond the range of earlier variants.

The increased range would allow Russian aircraft to release the bombs farther from the front line and reach targets previously considered beyond the range of glide bombs. However, the weapons could not reach Kyiv from occupied Crimea or southern Russia at their reported 200-kilometer range. Reuters reported that Russia was also developing a modification capable of traveling up to 400 kilometers.

Russia has continued upgrading the UMPK kit. In August 2024, Ukrainian reporting described a version designed to extend its range and improve flight correction. Russia later fielded the UMPB-5R, first used against Lozova on October 18, 2025, and the 3,000-kilogram FAB-3000. Together with the UMPB D-30SN, these systems provide different ranges and explosive payloads.

UMPK and UMPB bombs depend on satellite guidance. According to the JAPCC analysis, jamming GLONASS or GPS signals forces the bombs to rely on inertial navigation, which becomes less accurate during flight.

Ukraine’s Pokrova jamming system and other electronic-warfare tools have reportedly reduced UMPK accuracy. Failed UMPK-equipped bombs have been recovered on both sides of the front line. Russia has responded by installing jam-resistant Kometa satellite-navigation modules and increasing reliance on inertial guidance when satellite signals are disrupted.

Ukraine has responded by targeting the aircraft carrying the bombs and developing a domestic equivalent. A Ukrainian drone strike on Russia’s Morozovsk airbase, approximately 165 miles from the front line, destroyed one Su-34 and likely damaged two others. The Su-34 is Russia’s primary aircraft for releasing KABs.

Ukrainian officials say attacking aircraft and bomb-storage sites is the only reliable way to reduce these strikes. The bombs’ small radar signatures, unpredictable flight paths, and short flight times make them difficult to intercept.

Ukraine is also developing its own glide-bomb kit. In 2025, the Medoid design bureau tested a domestic module that traveled 60 kilometers after release from a Su-24. Engineers said its range could reach 80 kilometers or farther if released at higher altitude. By September, the system had been mounted on a MiG-29, indicating broader deployment.

Ukraine has primarily relied on Western-supplied JDAM kits and French AASM Hammer bombs, but supplies remain limited. In September 2025, a Ukrainian defense analyst estimated that the country would need to produce at least 100 glide bombs per day to approach Russia’s launch volume.

Ukraine’s second domestic glide-bomb program is the Vyrivniuvach, or “Equalizer,” unveiled in May 2026. DG Industry developed the weapon over 17 months through the government-backed Brave1 defense initiative.

Comparable in size to Russia’s FAB-250, the 250-kilogram bomb uses Ukrainian-designed wings and guidance. Ukraine is also developing domestic bomb bodies to reduce dependence on limited Soviet-era stocks. A MiG reportedly released the weapon against a Russian position during its first combat use on June 23, 2026, although deployment remains limited as production expands.

Ukrainian officials describe both programs as original designs intended to strike fortifications, command posts, and other targets behind the front line. The weapons are part of Ukraine’s attempt to replace imported systems with domestically produced alternatives.

The JAPCC analysis, co-authored by an Italian Air Force lieutenant colonel and a U.S. Air Force colonel, presents glide bombs as a broader challenge for NATO. Large numbers of inexpensive stand-off weapons can overwhelm far more costly air-defense systems.

The authors recommend disrupting the entire kill chain instead of relying on terminal interception. Their approach has three elements: protecting targets through dispersal and concealment, disrupting bombs through electronic warfare and low-cost interceptors, and destroying launch aircraft by suppressing enemy air defenses. This reflects Ukraine’s focus on attacking Russian aircraft and airbases rather than intercepting individual bombs.

Russia continues to extend the range of its glide bombs, while Ukraine is developing the Medoid system and the Vyrivniuvach but remains limited by production capacity.