The CIA and FBI are often depicted in movies for their roles in defending the nation against espionage and attacks by adversaries like China. Less recognized, however, is the critical role played by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in national security.
In August, the DOE announced nearly $1 billion in funding opportunities to strengthen the United States’ critical minerals and materials supply chains. Launched under President Trump’s Executive Order on Unleashing American Energy, the initiative aims to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers by boosting domestic mining, processing, and manufacturing.
Energy Secretary Chris Wright emphasized that reshoring critical material production is essential for national security, energy independence, and industrial competitiveness, noting that “for too long, the United States has relied on foreign actors to supply and process the critical materials that are essential to modern life and our national security.”
The funding will be spread across several strategic initiatives. A $50 million Critical Minerals and Materials Accelerator will advance technologies for rare-earth magnets, semiconductors, lithium extraction, and byproduct recovery. The Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains will provide up to $135 million to enhance domestic refining and recovery of rare earth elements, requiring partnerships with academic institutions.
Another $250 million program will pilot the recovery of valuable minerals from industrial processes, including coal-based industries, to reduce risks at commercial scale. In addition, $500 million will go toward battery materials processing, manufacturing, and recycling to expand domestic capacity for lithium, nickel, graphite, copper, and other key inputs.
The DOE’s Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy (ARPA-E) will also invest $40 million through its RECOVER program to extract critical minerals from industrial wastewater, complementing traditional mining.
The U.S. Department of Energy plays a critical but often overlooked role in national security. Beyond energy production, its responsibilities include maintaining the nuclear deterrent, protecting energy infrastructure, leading cybersecurity and emergency response efforts, and managing strategic resources.
Through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Department oversees nuclear weapons stewardship, as well as nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy, and the security of dangerous nuclear materials worldwide.
Energy security is further reinforced by the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), the world’s largest emergency crude oil supply. Stored in Gulf Coast salt caverns, the SPR has an authorized capacity of 714 million barrels; as of March 2025, it held 395.3 million barrels, equal to about 19 days of U.S. consumption or 47 days of imports. Recent bipartisan legislation seeks to ban SPR sales to adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, underscoring its strategic importance.
The Department is also investing nearly $1 billion to strengthen domestic critical mineral supply chains, expanding mining, processing, and manufacturing capacity for rare earths, semiconductors, and battery inputs. These programs aim to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers, secure key industries, and counter China’s dominance in global critical minerals markets.
The Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) leads the Department of Energy’s efforts to strengthen the resilience of U.S. energy infrastructure. As the Sector Risk Management Agency, CESER coordinates with intelligence and law enforcement to defend against physical and cyber threats. The urgency of this mission is underscored by an 80% increase in ransomware attacks on the energy sector in 2024.
China poses the most significant and sophisticated threat, operating through coordinated cyber campaigns designed to disrupt U.S. infrastructure. The most serious example is the Volt Typhoon campaign, in which Chinese state-sponsored actors compromised the IT environments of critical infrastructure across the continental U.S. and territories, including Guam.
According to CISA, NSA, and FBI assessments, Volt Typhoon intrusions were based on pre-positioning for destructive action, with hackers moving from IT networks toward operational technology systems.
The campaign’s scale was revealed when Chinese hackers remained inside the U.S. electric grid for 300 days in 2023. At the Littleton Electric Light & Water Department in Massachusetts, they spent nearly a year undetected, exfiltrating data on operational technology procedures and grid layouts before the FBI alerted the utility.
Such information would allow adversaries to know exactly where and how to launch destructive attacks. Reports from a December 2023 Geneva summit suggest Chinese officials indirectly admitted to these operations, which U.S. counterparts concluded were meant to deter American involvement in a Taiwan conflict.
China’s cyber threat has extended even further. In July 2025, state-sponsored groups identified as Linen Typhoon, Violet Typhoon, and Storm-2603 breached the National Nuclear Security Administration, directly compromising America’s nuclear security apparatus. Beyond cyberattacks, physical vulnerabilities are also a concern.
Undocumented radios discovered in Chinese-made solar inverters highlight risks within the hardware that connects solar panels and batteries to the U.S. grid, creating a vast potential attack surface.
American security officials warn these activities represent deliberate preparation for destructive action. Then-FBI Director Christopher Wray stated in 2024 that “China’s hackers are positioning on American infrastructure in preparation to wreak havoc and cause real-world harm.” Former NSA Director Mike Rogers added in May 2025 that Beijing clearly values placing elements of U.S. core infrastructure at risk of disruption or destruction.
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