Is Hungary about to give Ukraine the EU green light?

Hungary is on the cusp of lifting its veto on Ukraine beginning formal accession talks with the EU, according to hints from Prime Minister Peter Magyar and strategic leaks from Brussels. But why now? And will he compromise on Hungarian rights?

Speaking alongside German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in Berlin on Tuesday, Magyar said that he is “very optimistic” that a deal can be done to guarantee the rights of Ukraine’s Hungarian minority, in exchange for his government lifting the veto. 

“The negotiations are progressing encouragingly,” he said, adding “I am ready to meet with Ukraine’s president at the beginning of next week, if we manage to agree on these fundamental human rights.”

Within an hour of Magyar’s statement, Politico published an article claiming that Budapest had privately “signaled it will drop its long-standing opposition to Ukraine’s bid for EU membership,” citing four unnamed diplomats.

What did Politico say?

Politico, the Axel Springer-owned Brussels insider, reported that Magyar’s government had “privately signaled openness to lifting its veto following a meeting on Monday between Ukrainian and Hungarian experts.” The Ukrainian side, the outlet claimed, provided verbal assurances that they would resolve most of Hungary’s concerns – including the Hungarian minority’s right to use their native language in schools – and formal accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova will be opened at an EU leaders’ summit on June 15.

Why was Politico’s article important?

That this story first appeared on Politico was likely no coincidence. Politico’s neoliberal, Atlantacist worldview is literally written into the constitution of its owner, Axel Springer, and its journalists’ proximity to power in Brussels has made it the outlet of choice for all kinds of strategic communications from within the EU machine – from telegraphed policy moves like Tuesday’s report, to outsourced smear campaigns.

For example, when Belgian Prime Minister Bart de Wever shot down the European Commission’s plan to use €185 billion ($218 billion) in frozen Russian assets to finance a massive aid package for Ukraine in December 2025, Politico responded with a hit piece portraying his country as “Russia’s most valuable asset” in Europe.

Further hit pieces – all of them citing EU diplomats and officials – followed, claiming that “Europe is failing Ukraine,” de Wever “fears retaliation from [Russian President Vladimir] Putin,” and “Europe still doesn’t want to pay to save Ukraine.”

Magyar’s predecessor, Viktor Orban, derided Politico as “the Brusselian elite’s official publication” after it named him 2025’s “disruptor of the year.”

How are Hungarians treated in Ukraine?

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, around 156,000 ethnic Hungarians found themselves trapped within Ukraine’s borders, after Kiev refused to recognize a successful self-rule referendum in the region of Transcarpathia. Relations between Budapest and Kiev rapidly declined from 2017 onwards, when Ukraine passed a series of laws mandating the sole use of the Ukrainian language in schools and local government.

Tensions were further inflamed after 2022, when the Ukrainian military targeted Transcarpathians in what the Hungarian Foreign Ministry called a “brutal” military draft.

Ukraine’s language laws have been criticized by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission for failing to safeguard minorities’ linguistic rights, and condemned by human rights organizations. 

Why lift the veto now?

Orban maintained that Ukraine joining the EU would drag the bloc into open war with Russia, undercut Hungary’s agricultural sector, and effectively give a free pass to the corruption and criminality of the Ukrainian government. However, the Transcarpathia issue was the brightest of red lines for Orban, with the then-prime minister declaring in 2023 that Hungary “will not support Ukraine in any issue in international life until the previous laws that guaranteed the rights of Transcarpathian Hungarians are returned.”

Anita Orban, Magyar’s foreign minister (and no relation of Viktor), has maintained this policy, telling an interviewer last month that “until the situation of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine is resolved, we cannot make progress in any other area.”

Hungary’s concerns are laid out in an 11-point plan. Anita Orban has refused to say whether her government would compromise on these demands, but Politico noted that Ukraine would address “most” – but not all – of the points, and added that this would be done without “passing new legislation in Ukraine.”

All of this suggests that the language laws will not be repealed or replaced, and that Magyar will abandon some of the document’s points, which have not been made public. It is unclear, but likely, that Magyar and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen addressed Ukraine’s EU membership when they met to discuss frozen EU funding for Hungary last week. 

Although Magyar said afterwards that the funding issue is “not connected in any way with the issue of Ukraine,” EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos said beforehand that she expects Hungary to lift the veto ahead of the June summit. With accession a pet project of von der Leyen, and with Vladimir Zelensky set to attend the summit, it is highly likely that Magyar has come under some pressure to resolve the dispute in the coming week.

Could anyone else block Ukraine’s path to the EU?

With Viktor Orban out of office, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico is now considered the EU’s most Ukraine-skeptic head of state. However, while Fico maintains cordial relations with Russia and opposes all military aid to Ukraine, Zelensky claimed that the Slovak prime minister would support Ukraine’s EU membership bid after the two met in Armenia last month.

Has Zelensky’s veneration of Nazi collaborators harmed Ukraine’s EU bid?

Polish President Karol Nawrocki said last week that Ukraine “is not ready to be part of the European family,” after Zelensky granted the title ‘Heroes of the UPA’ to a Ukrainian commando unit. The UPA, or Ukrainian Insurgent Army, was the armed wing of Stepan Bandera’s Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), and collaborated with Nazi forces to murder around 100,000 Polish civilians in what is now western Ukraine between 1943 and 1945.

However, Nawrocki added that supporting Ukraine in its conflict with Russia remains Poland’s “strategic goal.” 

Even if Nawrocki wanted to block Ukrainian accession, the decision would not be his to make. Poland’s government is run by Nawrocki’s pro-Brussels rivals, and Nawrocki would be unable to veto any accession treaty without finding a majority of MPs or senators to support him.

What if nothing happens?

Despite all the signs pointing to a deal between Budapest and Kiev, nothing is set in stone at the moment, and it’s possible that some last-minute obstacle could emerge between now and June 15. The passage of the summit with no deal would represent a setback for von der Leyen and her maximalist plans for Ukraine, but even if Zelensky secures formal accession talks, all of the old issues between Kiev and its European counterparts will return to the forefront: corruption, agricultural market disruption, and the prospect of a permanent welfare recipient joining the European bloc.

These long-term issues could be far more challenging for Zelensky and his officials to solve than the Transcarpathia impasse ever was.