Iraqi Kurdistan Remains A Vital Strategic Asset For The United States

Amid historical changes in the balance of power in the Middle East, at least one thing remains constant: the strategic importance of the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan for the United States. The enclave has long played a pivotal role in U.S.-led coalition counter-Islamic State operations in Iraq and neighboring Syria.

Masoud Barzani, veteran leader of the leading Kurdistan Democratic Party, recently gave a detailed hour-long interview about the latest developments in the Middle East. Among other things, he warned of the continued threat posed by ISIS, stressing that his region’s Peshmerga forces are “ready and more than ready” to fight the group again if it regains its former strength.

Powerful pro-Iran political factions in Baghdad, which helped bring the incumbent central government to power, have long pushed for a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. Those U.S. troops came to Iraq in 2014 to help combat ISIS and officially ended their combat mission in December 2021, remaining to train and advise Iraqi and Kurdish security forces. In September 2024, the U.S. announced a plan to withdraw hundreds of troops from Iraq by September 2025, while some would remain, most likely in Iraqi Kurdistan’s Erbil, to support counter-ISIS operations in Syria until at least September 2026.

However, the dramatic fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in early December 2024 has reportedly put a damper on enthusiasm in Baghdad for ejecting U.S. troops. Iraq’s pro-Iran factions had aligned with Tehran in supporting Assad throughout Syria’s brutal civil war. Pro-Iran Iraqi militias regularly entered Syria to fight on Assad’s behalf against his numerous opponents. Those opponents, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, who previously headed the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, are in power in Damascus, so Baghdad is worried.

The United States has at least 2,000 troops in northeast Syria, where it has supported the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS since that group rampaged across the region in 2014 and declared its self-styled caliphate. The SDF liberated all Syrian territory the group had usurped into its tyrannical caliphate by 2019. Several thousand ISIS militants and their families have since languished in SDF-run camps, detention centers, and prisons. ISIS remnants have tried to free them in the past and regroup. The SDF has long warned that attacks against their region by Turkish-backed militias and Turkey itself risks diverting their limited resources away from guarding these camps.

ISIS invaded Iraq from the foothold it gained in eastern Syria during the civil war and infamously subjugated one-third of Iraq’s territory under its caliphate between 2014 and 2017. The U.S. intervened after ISIS infamously subjected the Yazidi minority of Sinjar to a campaign of genocide and threatened Erbil in August 2014. Throughout that war, the Peshmerga, long denied modern weapons by Baghdad, held the line against ISIS in the north, protecting the oil-rich Kirkuk region and securing important routes for Iraq’s eventual liberation of its second city Mosul.

Today, the SDF is again under assault by Turkey and its proxy Syrian militias, which fight under the banner of the self-styled Syrian National Army. At the same time, the new authorities under Sharaa—who has gone from Syria’s de-facto leader to its president, ostensibly only for the current transitional phase—are reluctant to accept any autonomy or self-rule for Syria’s Kurds. Furthermore, Damascus does not want the SDF to remain as a fighting force outside the new army nor have its own military bloc within it.

Barzani’s KDP and the ruling PYD political party in Syria’s Kurdish region have been at odds in the past. The PYD and its YPG armed wing, now the backbone of the multi-ethnic SDF, originated as an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, commonly known by its Kurdish acronym, the PKK. Turkey and the PKK have fought a conflict since 1984, and Ankara has long designated it a terrorist group, making no distinction between the PKK and the YPG, deeming the latter a security threat. Abdi was a member of the PKK for decades but has long worked closely with the U.S. in the joint fight against ISIS.

In a significant development, Barzani recently hosted Abdi for a cordial meeting about the future of Syria’s Kurds in his office in Erbil. In his recent interview, the KDP leader revealed he had advised the SDF commander “to not give up and resort to the path of dialogue and relinquish any foreign influence and to unify the Kurdish position.” Barzani expressed his view that it was time for the PKK to leave “Syrian Kurds alone to decide their future” since its presence provides “an excuse for Turkish intervention.” Abdi had already stated that non-Syrian Kurdish fighters, including PKK members, would leave Syria if there was a total ceasefire with Turkey and its marauding militia proxies.

Turkey and the SNA continue attacking the SDF, killing civilians in the process. If this conflict continues, the ever-present risk of an ISIS resurgence that could threaten Syria and the wider region only increases. Turkey has called on Damascus to take over control of the SDF-run camps and prisons holding ISIS members. It’s unclear how Damascus could do so without first reaching an agreement and coordinating with the SDF unless, of course, it’s willing to risk a scenario in which many of these prisoners could escape.

More generally, Damascus opposes adopting a federal system for the new Syria. Given their long history of oppression by successive Syrian regimes, Syria’s Kurds are understandably anxious about what the re-centralization of power could mean for them and their hard-won gains.

In his interview, Barzani said Iraqi Kurdistan could play an essential role in helping the Syrian Kurdish political factions unify and negotiate their future within the new Syria with Damascus. Asked if it would help militarily, he expressed his hope that “neither them nor us will have to resort to using military force.” When asked if he might send the Peshmerga to help Syrian Kurds if they were once again oppressed or faced injustice, Barzani answered, “Frankly, not only Kurds but any human who is exposed to injustice, and if we could help them, we would help them without hesitation.”

Such comments underscore Iraqi Kurdistan’s continued strategic importance and positive role in regional stability. Erbil could potentially play a significant diplomatic role in resolving issues between the Syrian Kurds, Damascus, and Turkey. And in the worst-case scenario that conflict once again breaks out in Syria and ISIS tries to reconstitute itself, Iraqi Kurdistan stands ready to help confront it again. For these reasons, it remains an enduring strategic asset and reliable partner for Washington in that troubled part of the world.