Iran: The foreign policy puzzle that keeps defeating Washington

Britain was already struggling by the late 1960s. The country was mired in economic crisis, the pound had been devalued, and the Labour government was forced into painful public spending cuts. At the same time, the glow of Britain’s former imperial influence in the Middle East was fading.

After the Suez Crisis, the region had effectively passed into the hands of the new superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. The Six-Day War in 1967 further complicated London’s position. Relations deteriorated with both Israel and the Arab states, leaving Britain with shrinking influence and few reliable partners.

The British government attempted to preserve its remaining economic interests in the region, particularly the role of British companies in the oil sector and Arab investment flowing into London’s financial markets. In the end, it lost both.

When the International Monetary Fund, with strong backing from Washington, pressed London to cut foreign policy spending, Harold Wilson’s government decided to reduce its military presence east of Suez. Yet Britain could not entirely abandon the region. Its base in Cyprus remained essential, forming part of the Cyprus-Malta-Gibraltar chain of strategic hubs that had historically allowed Britain to control the Mediterranean and the vital routes to the Indian Ocean and East Asia.

Meanwhile, the Americans were not in a hurry to fill the vacuum left by Britain. By the early 1970s the United States already had a modest military footprint in the Persian Gulf: a naval presence in Bahrain under a 1948 agreement, limited forces in Saudi Arabia based on a 1951 arrangement, and the first steps toward a military presence in the newly formed United Arab Emirates in 1972.

Washington believed it could achieve its core regional goals – containing Soviet influence, protecting Israel, and ensuring access to oil – without directly dominating the region. Instead, it relied on two key partners: Saudi Arabia and Iran.

This approach became known as the twin pillar strategy.

Riyadh and Tehran, representing the Sunni and Shia branches of Islam respectively, were meant to anchor America’s relationship with the Muslim world. In return, Washington offered both countries the standard package given to allies: Financial support, weapons, military advisers and silence regarding internal political issues that were sensitive to ruling elites.

For a time, the system appeared stable. Then Iran exploded.

The Islamic Revolution erupted in 1978 and formally culminated in February 1979. Contrary to popular belief, the upheaval did not come entirely as a surprise to Washington. Officials were well aware that dissatisfaction with the Shah’s rule was growing.

Corruption, widening social inequality, out of touch elites, and the brutality of the SAVAK secret police had created deep resentment. A demand for a return to Islamic values had matured in Iran, and an alliance of the Islamic clergy and left-wing forces, supported by the middle classes, set out to take on the monarchy. 

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi turned to America for help. But in Washington, there was no consensus about rescuing him. President Jimmy Carter considered the Shah politically toxic. The State Department believed events had already moved beyond the point where intervention could save the regime. Congress was divided: Some believed the Shah still had a chance, others concluded he was finished.

Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was among the strongest advocates of military support for the Shah. But his view did not prevail. Soon, however, another crisis emerged and with it one of the defining episodes in modern US-Iran relations.

After fleeing Iran, the Shah asked the US for permission to enter the country for medical treatment. He had been diagnosed with leukemia years earlier. Carter eventually agreed. To many Iranians, however, the decision confirmed their suspicions that Washington remained complicit in the Shah’s rule.

In November 1979, revolutionary students stormed the US Embassy in Tehran and seized 66 American diplomats and staff. What followed was the 444-day hostage crisis that would dominate Carter’s presidency. 

With an election approaching, the White House sought a solution. Brzezinski once again pushed for military action. His call to “lance the boil,” deal decisively with a problem before it worsens, became part of Washington’s political vocabulary.

The result was Operation Eagle Claw, a daring plan to rescue the hostages. On paper, the operation appeared straightforward: Commandos would land in the Iranian desert, move toward Tehran, storm the embassy, free the hostages and evacuate them by air.

However, reality proved different. A violent sandstorm disrupted the operation, disabling several helicopters. One collided with a transport aircraft. Eight American servicemen were killed.

The mission failed. The hostages remained captive. Carter’s presidency never recovered. In the 1980 election, he suffered a devastating defeat to Ronald Reagan. Thus the Iranian problem had claimed its first US president.

The hostage crisis ended in January 1981 with the signing of the Algiers Accords, under which the US agreed to unfreeze Iranian assets and refrain from interfering in Iran’s internal affairs. Yet even as the agreement was signed, new confrontations were already unfolding.

In September 1980, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Iran, hoping to exploit the revolutionary chaos and seize the oil-rich province of Khuzestan. Officials in Washington decided that Saddam represented the lesser evil, and money, weapons, technology, and intelligence began flowing to Iraq.

Paradoxically, Israel, despite its hostility toward the Islamic Republic, also provided assistance to Tehran during the war. Israel viewed Iraq as the greater strategic threat and hoped that helping Iran might eventually reopen the door to relations with Tehran.

The situation became even more complicated when it emerged that the US was secretly supplying arms to Iran as well, with the proceeds diverted to support the Contras in Nicaragua. The Iran-Contra affair became the largest scandal of Ronald Reagan’s presidency.

For the second time, Iran had severely damaged the reputation of a US president, and by the late 1980s, US-Iran relations had hardened into open confrontation.

The US attacked Iranian oil platforms in 1988 and sank several Iranian naval vessels. That same year, an American warship mistakenly shot down Iran Air Flight 655, killing all 290 passengers and crew. Although Washington paid compensation, it never formally accepted responsibility.

In the 1990s, the US adopted a policy of dual containment, targeting both Iran and Iraq simultaneously through sanctions and regional alliances. Attempts at rapprochement later emerged during the presidency of Iranian reformist Mohammad Khatami and US President Bill Clinton, but these initiatives ultimately stalled.

Later, the confrontation deepened again in the 2000s. The US invasion of Iraq unintentionally strengthened Iran’s regional influence. Meanwhile, allegations that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons drew increasing international attention.

The issue dominated the presidency of Barack Obama, who ultimately negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Under the agreement, Iran accepted restrictions on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.

Israel and several Arab states were deeply skeptical of the deal, arguing it left Iran’s regional ambitions untouched. When Donald Trump entered the White House in 2017, he withdrew the US from the agreement and imposed sweeping sanctions on Tehran.

Trump also pursued a new regional alignment through the Abraham Accords, which brought Israel closer to several Arab states and placed Iran firmly at the center of US Middle East strategy. This meant tensions steadily escalated.

In January 2020, the US killed Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the elite Quds Force, in a drone strike, as the confrontation entered yet another phase.

Joe Biden initially attempted to revive the nuclear agreement but faced obstacles on both sides. Negotiations dragged on while regional tensions intensified. Israel’s wars against Hamas and Hezbollah, the fall of the Assad government in Syria, and renewed American pressure on Tehran set the stage for the latest escalation.

Within months of Trump’s second presidency, Israeli strikes killed senior Iranian officials in Tehran. The US then attacked nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. Eight months later, the conflict reached an unprecedented level when US and Israeli strikes killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. A new chapter had begun.

Over nearly five decades, the US-Iran confrontation has developed its own internal logic. American objectives have multiplied: Limiting Iran’s regional influence, dismantling its nuclear and missile programs, changing the regime in Tehran, restoring US influence inside the country, and reassuring nervous regional allies.

Successive presidents have struggled with this dilemma. Some avoided decisive action. Others escalated confrontation without fully resolving the underlying problem. 

Having always dreamed of joining the pantheon of great presidents who transformed America, Trump believed he could finally break the cycle. But in trying to force a decisive outcome, he may instead be joining a familiar pattern in American history: A pattern in which presidents underestimate the complexity of Iran and find themselves drawn deeper into a crisis that has no easy resolution.

Some leaders shape history, while others get caught up in it.

This article was first published by the magazine Profile and was translated and edited by the RT team.