New evidence reveals that China has modernized and expanded several signal interception stations in Cuba.
The close collaboration between Cuba and the People’s Republic of China in intelligence matters has reignited security alarms in Washington. In 2023, U.S. officials publicly confirmed that Beijing was leveraging espionage facilities on the Caribbean island, less than 100 miles from Florida.
Cuba, once host to the massive Soviet Lourdes intelligence center during the Cold War, has become an advanced listening post for China.
New evidence — including high-resolution satellite imagery — shows that China has modernized and expanded several signals intelligence (SIGINT) stations in Cuba, positioning them to monitor sensitive U.S. military communications in its own backyard. This foreign penetration presents a direct and unprecedented strategic challenge not seen since the Missile Crisis.
Classification of Chinese espionage sites in Cuba.
Based on open-source intelligence (OSINT), classified intelligence reports, and analysis from centers such as CSIS, there is confirmed or highly likely presence of at least eight sites of interest used or prepared for signals intelligence (SIGINT) by China or with support from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Below are the sites classified according to the level of verification:
Note: These classifications are based on CSIS documentation (2024), Department of Defense reports, and public satellite observations.
Recruitment mechanisms: silent infiltration.
China has for decades deployed sophisticated recruitment techniques to place agents within the U.S. government and military. Cases such as Glenn Duffie Shriver, recruited while studying in China to apply to the CIA; or former military intelligence officer Ron Hansen, sentenced in 2019 for attempting to pass classified information to the Chinese government, reveal a long-term, systemic strategy.
The story also includes Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a CIA analyst recruited by China in the 1950s who transmitted secrets for nearly 30 years. More recently, the case of Ambassador Víctor Manuel Rocha, infiltrated for decades by Cuban intelligence, raises serious questions about Sino-Cuban collaboration capabilities in HUMINT (human intelligence).
Internal and external surveillance from Cuba.
The Cuban regime ensures its internal survival, shielded by Chinese technology that allows it to anticipate dissent, monitor the population, and suppress protests before they escalate.
China secures an advanced technical espionage node against the U.S., without deploying visible military infrastructure, and with privileged access to communications, satellites, and bases in the southern U.S.
China’s presence in Cuba should be understood as part of a strategic negotiation: Beijing protects the Cuban regime from within through technology, surveillance, and repression in exchange for operational freedom to spy from the island. This dual-purpose makes Cuba the closest example of the «21st-century authoritarian alliance.»
Technological platforms used by the PRC and PLA.
The facilities in Bejucal, Calabazar, and El Salao show the use of CDAAs (circularly disposed antenna arrays) and parabolic antenna systems for signal interception. Bejucal, in particular, was expanded with a new CDAA in 2024.
These platforms allow high-frequency signal triangulation, missile launch tracking, and monitoring of radar networks and military communications.
Companies like Huawei and ZTE have been involved in Cuba’s telecommunications infrastructure, raising credible suspicions that these civilian platforms could enable interception or cyber-intelligence activities.
Chinese telecommunications infrastructure in Cuba (Huawei, ZTE, and others).
This list details the main communications facilities linked to Chinese companies (Huawei, ZTE, CEIEC) in Cuba, with potential applications in electronic intelligence, strategic surveillance, and C4ISR support.
Note: Sources include CSIS, leaked technical reports, ETECSA bidding contracts, and OSINT analysis of networks and BTS towers. Most of these assets are directly or indirectly connected to network infrastructure controlled by Chinese entities.
Chinese surveillance cameras in Cuba.
Technical observation: These cameras are connected to Huawei telecommunications networks, allowing centralized control from command centers linked to the Ministry of the Interior (MININT).
While officially justified as “public safety” tools, their real-time facial and behavioral analysis capabilities raise concerns over their dual-use as civil surveillance infrastructure and C4ISR support assets under foreign oversight.
Their proximity to strategic nodes (such as Bejucal, Calabazar, or the U.S. Embassy) makes them potential real-time visual intelligence platforms, complementing the Chinese SIGINT capabilities already identified on Cuban territory.
Policy recommendations for the U.S.
- Strengthen military and diplomatic cryptography, including satellite communications and critical data links.
- Deploy technical and cyber counterintelligence platforms to interfere with or deceive Chinese SIGINT systems in Cuba.
- Engage in active diplomacy with Caribbean and Hispanic america countries to prevent the expansion of Chinese bases or similar collaborations.
- Expand FBI and Department of Defense counterintelligence programs, including internal awareness campaigns.
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