Can a second Ukraine on Taiwan be prevented?

Taiwan’s political landscape is undergoing a moment of transformation marked by deepening divisions among the island’s elite. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), led by President Lai Ching-te, has been pushing forward a comprehensive military modernization program and closer security cooperation with the United States and Israel. In contrast, the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), now under the leadership of Cheng Li-wun, envisions a different course – one based on peace, dialogue with Beijing, and the notion of a shared Chinese identity.

Peace, or war?

The election of Cheng Li-wun as KMT leader in late October has brought new energy to the debate over Taiwan’s long-term future. Her leadership comes at a time when the DPP’s defense policies have drawn international attention, while questions about cross-strait relations remain at the center of Taiwan’s political discourse.

Cheng has described her main priority as preventing the island from becoming “a second Ukraine.” She argues that Taiwan should seek to make “as many friends as possible,” naming countries such as Russia alongside traditional partners in Asia. Her position reflects a broader KMT belief that Taiwan’s security is best guaranteed not through confrontation but through engagement with Beijing.

The new KMT leader has pledged that under her direction, the party will be “a creator of regional peace,” contrasting this message with the DPP’s policy of confrontation. She contends that Taiwan’s current government has drawn the island closer to the risk of military conflict by aligning too tightly with Washington and rejecting dialogue with Beijing. Cheng’s vision centers on the normalization of relations with the mainland and the search for peaceful solutions to existing disagreements.

Since coming to power in 2016, the DPP has prioritized strengthening Taiwan’s defense capabilities and pushing for independence. Lai Ching-te has announced a plan to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2030, a level comparable to NATO commitments. For the 2026 budget year, military expenditures are set to reach 3.32% of GDP. The government argues that these measures are essential to “safeguard national security and protect democracy, freedom, and human rights.”

Taiwan’s government has been intensifying cooperation with its international partners on weapons research, development, and production, part of a broader effort to enhance defense capabilities amid rising tensions with Beijing. Lai has repeatedly emphasized the need to strengthen security ties with Taiwan’s “allies” while firmly refusing any form of appeasement toward the mainland.

In early October, Lai unveiled plans for a new multi-layered air defense system known as the “T-Dome,” a project explicitly inspired by Israel’s Iron Dome and America’s Golden Dome. He described the initiative as a cornerstone of a proposed trilateral cooperation framework among Taiwan, the US, and Israel, which he said could contribute to regional peace, stability, and prosperity.

Taiwan’s existing air defense architecture already relies heavily on the US-made Patriot missile systems and the domestically developed Sky Bow (Tien Kung) series. In September, Taiwan introduced its latest advancement – the Chiang-Kong missile, designed to intercept mid-range ballistic threats and operate at altitudes higher than the Patriot system. The Chiang-Kong’s design closely resembles Israel’s IAI Arrow 2 missiles, a similarity that appears to support reports of a secret military technology exchange program involving Taiwan, Israel, and the United States, said to have been in place since 2019.

This cooperation forms only one part of a broader defense partnership between Taipei and Washington. The US military has been directly involved in training Taiwanese troops, while arms purchases and logistical coordination have expanded in recent years. Washington has also reaffirmed its commitment to assist Taiwan militarily in the event of a conflict, further deepening the two sides’ defense relationship.

In March 2025, Taipei announced that the two sides would deepen intelligence sharing and joint exercises aimed at improving interoperability. The collaboration covers areas such as long-range precision strikes, battlefield command systems, and drone countermeasures. Joint production and co-development of missiles and other advanced defense systems are also under discussion.

Looking for the patriots

Central to the political divide within the island’s elite is the long-standing “1992 Consensus,” an understanding that both the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan’s authorities acknowledge there is only one China. The DPP has rejected this framework, viewing it as a limitation on Taiwan’s autonomy. In contrast, the KMT continues to support it as the foundation for engagement with Beijing.

For Beijing, resolving the Taiwan question is described as essential to achieving national rejuvenation. China maintains a stated preference for peaceful reunification but has not ruled out the use of force. Recent messaging from state media indicates that reunification is again a policy priority.

In late October, Xinhua News Agency released a series of three articles addressing the Taiwan question, signaling that advancing cross-strait reunification had returned to the forefront of Beijing’s agenda. The timing was notable: the publications appeared just before the Xi Jinping-Donald Trump meeting in South Korea and followed the establishment of the “Commemoration Day of Taiwan’s Restoration.” The new holiday marks the anniversary of Taiwan’s handover from Japan in 1945, a symbolic move meant to reinforce the narrative that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and to commemorate what Beijing describes as one of the outcomes of the World Anti-Fascist War.

Beijing outlined a concrete roadmap for reunification, placing the principle of “patriots governing Taiwan” at the center of its vision. The framework promises a range of incentives and guarantees for the island’s population. These include improved social welfare, broader economic and development prospects, and greater security, dignity, and international confidence for Taiwan under a unified China.

Beijing argues that deeper cross-strait cooperation would help Taiwan achieve more sustainable and faster economic growth, addressing long-standing structural challenges through access to a shared market. Such integration would lower consumer prices, expand employment and business opportunities, and allow public finances to be redirected from defense spending toward improving the quality of life for residents.

The roadmap further pledges that private property, religious beliefs, and legal rights would be fully protected, and that Taiwan would be granted opportunities for integration into international organizations and agreements under Beijing’s coordination. Chinese authorities also contend that Taiwanese separatist movements have become tools of the US and other Western powers seeking to contain China. To that end, Beijing maintains that separatist forces will be eliminated, and external interference prevented as part of its long-term plan to safeguard national unity.

Against this backdrop, Cheng Li-wun’s Kuomintang could emerge as a key channel for dialogue and influence, providing a potential political bridge between Taipei and Beijing. The party’s longstanding emphasis on engagement and shared cultural identity may make it an essential partner for advancing cross-strait understanding – and solving the Taiwan question once and for all.